Benjamin's inverted Nietzscheanism retains a critical suspicion towards culture and a rejection of certain bourgeois values but is oriented towards a historical remembrance of the oppressed and an overcoming of the oppressive material conditions of existing cultural production and reproduction. 2 In this it perhaps has less in common with Clark's tragic nihilism and more with Malcolm Bull's strategy of sidestepping Nietzsche's rhetoric by identifying with the victims of these texts: "In order to read like a loser you have to accept the argument but turn its consequences against yourself" (Bull 2011: 37) . To speak of Benjamin's anti-Nietzscheanism is, however, not to devalue the enduring significance of Nietzsche's philosophy for his thought but to indicate the struggle to delineate an alternative exit route from its tragic perspective than that proposed in the aesthetic affirmation of Nietzsche's early works or the Zarathustran overcoming of his later ones. This approach provides Benjamin with a catastrophic vision of history redeemable by a recuperation of the same revolutionary Jeztzeit that Nietzsche identified with the "Franco-Jewish levelling" of the Communards. 3 The following discussion seeks to extend the implications of this anti-Nietzscheanismand in particular its valorization of revolutionary Jeztzeit and social levelling -beyond the more familiar terrain of Benjamin's dialectical engagement with the crisis of art and culture (most famously in the Work of Art essay's opposition to the aestheticization of politics) into what has been declared -from Hannah Arendt (2006 Arendt ( [1954 : 172) to Martha Nussbaum (2010: 73-7) -to 4 be a comparable crisis in formal systems of mass education over the last half century. To do so, it will begin by exploring the influence of Nietzsche's early educational writings on Benjamin's own early understanding of the cultural significance of Youth, before examining Benjamin's attempt to distance himself from the tragic consequences of this position in his later writings.
The argument in the first part of this article is that the nature of Benjamin's break from certain Nietzschean features of his own writings on Youth constitutes the "cryptic" submerging -but not disappearance -of this pedagogical layer of his philosophy.
I.
For the first time in my life, I understand Goethe's words: "Only where you are let everything be-always childlike [Nur wo du bist sei alles-immer kindlich]. Thus you are everything -you are invincible." -Walter Benjamin (letter of May 5, 1913) Nietzsche's early reflections on the political foundations of classical and modern culture in The Greek State (and The Birth of Tragedy, in which the essay was originally intended to be included) are the prelude to a broader analysis of education developed in a series of public lectures On the Future of Our Educational Institutions and in the Untimely Meditations. 4 In his first lecture, Nietzsche -comparing himself to a Roman hauerspex who steals a glimpse of the Future from the sacrificed entrails of the Present -discerns two tendencies in German educational institutions: the tendency to maximize and extend education to the greatest number of people and the tendency to minimize and impoverish education by professionalizing it in relation to the State (Nietzsche 2009 ). 5 The first is driven, in part, by an enlightened fear of the oppressive nature of older religious power, and would promote culture through education as a secular counterforce capable of scattering these religious instincts. But it is also motivated by what Nietzsche pointedly calls the "dogmas" of modern political economy: a narrow and short-term utilitarianism of needs that stems from the factitious bond drawn between intelligence and property. Education furthers the interests of the economy to the extent that, in as rapid a manner as possible, it rears men who are current in the same ways coins have currency. Here, Nietzsche anticipates the secularized and foreshortened version of the religious concept of 'the vocational' that dominants the rhetoric of contemporary systems of mass education and, in the linking of intelligence and property, its accompanying drive to credentialism (see Osborne 2010) . Consequently, the bourgeoisie seeks to conserve and reproduce its power by furthering the modern forces of culture against the older ones of religion, while attempting to yoke and tame the liberating powers of culture in accordance with its own economic interests.
The second tendency to weaken education is not opposed to this extension but complements it through the subordination of all strivings after education to reasons of State, as manifested in the idea of the Kulturstaat associated with Hegel, Fichte, Humboldt, and others (Jarausch 1982: 160-161) . In contrast to the classical and aristocratic ideal of a genuine education for culture, measured by the cultivation of great spiritual, philosophical and artistic individuals, the State must intervene in education to drive the few individuals of genius into exile in order to "liberate" the masses into barbarism by convincing them they are capable of thinking, acting and discovering for themselves, under the guidance of the State.
In a sentiment similar to that expressed in The Greek State, one of the young student interlocutors in On the Future of Our Educational Institutions recalls the "cardinal principle of 6 all culture," as taught by the older philosopher: "[N]o one would strive to attain culture if he knew how incredibly small the number of really cultured people actually is, and can ever be" and how reliant such culture is on "the prodigious multitude" who, "led on by an alluring delusion...devote themselves to education" even though they can never themselves be cultured (Nietzsche 2009) . Those who pursue the education of the "stupid, dull masses" and "regard as their goal the emancipation of the masses from the mastery of the great few" therefore seek to overthrow the most sacred hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect: "the servitude of the masses, their submissive obedience, their instinct of loyalty to the rule of genius."
In an important and characteristic development, Nietzsche makes clear that these two destructive tendencies find their perfect combination in journalism. Since journalism is defined by its devotion to the present -the reproduction of the timely or fashionable aspects of the day (jour) -it radically deflates the temporal horizons of education, conflating the means and the end of education into the "present day": a journalistic pseudo-education aims at nothing but -indeed, already is -a journalistic pseudo-culture. To adapt Bill Readings's argument in The University in Ruins, the subsequent academic institutionalization of Cultural Studies in the late twentieth century "must be understood to arise when culture ceases to be the animating principle of the university [that is, its goal or end] and …becomes instead an object of study among others" (1996: 92). When Nietzsche's young student complains that, the "very style" of a "newspaper, the latest novel, or one of those learned books…already bears the revolting impress of modern barbaric culture," he introduces the milieu of the cultural philistine, explored in further detail in the Untimely Meditations.
Here the very eternity and individuality of the spiritual and cultural leader -who for Nietzsche is an unhistorical or transhistorical individual -is rejected for the topicality of the 7 political, literally reducing the new to the political novelty of the news. In this respect, the greedy instincts of Jeztzeit may similarly be said to be at work. For, every "philosophy which believes that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say solved, by a political event is a joke-and pseudo-philosophy," Nietzsche writes, for how "should a political innovation suffice to turn men once and for all into contented inhabitants of the earth?" (1997: 147-8) . The vocational professionalization of educational institutions in the interests of the State privileges the narrowest measure of social utility, one that results in a destructive tendency towards increasing academic specialization and that renders the expertise of the intellectual incapable of passing judgement on anything but the smallest aspect of contemporary society.
The corrupting substitution of an education-for-culture for a journalist education-aspolitics simultaneously liberates the true intellectual from the antagonistic demands of cultural greatness, such that the tensions of philosophical life dissipate into the chatter of journalistic selfexpression. This levelling of cultural distinctions represents a "flight from one's self," Nietzsche claims, "an ascetic expiration of their cultural impulses, a desperate attempt to annihilate their own individuality" (Nietzsche 2009 ). Journalism represents the corruption of artistic or cultural style for Nietzsche. If culture is defined as a "unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people," as Nietzsche suggests in the Untimely Meditations (1997: 5) , modern pseudoculture is precisely that ephemeral multiplicity of styles that appears unified only to the cultural philistine -who, unlike the philistine of the past who is opposed to culture, is precisely the philistine who thinks he or she is cultured -because it reflects back his own chaotic lack of style (1997: 7-8) . As he writes a decade later in The Gay Science, "One thing is needful. To 'give style' to one's character -a great and rare art!" (2001: 163-4). Nietzsche's writings themselves reveal, he confesses, a "modern character …marked by weakness of personality " (1997: 116) . Here Nietzsche protests against the "historical education of modern people" that has in part sprung from Hegelian philosophy and that paralyses the natural poetic impulse of Youth, "the first generation of fighters and dragon-slayers which will precede a happier and fairer culture and 9 humanity" and "from which alone, as a fruitful soil, a deep and noble culture can grow forth" (1997: 116, 121; 2009 Congress in 1914 Congress in (1994 . In "School Reform: A Cultural Movement," he writes that: "The school receives a generation...full of images, which it brings with it from the land of the future. After all, the culture of the future is the ultimate goal of school -and for this reason it must remain silent before the future that comes toward it in the form of youth" (2011:
59-60, emphasis added).
In his discussion of 'Schopenhauer as Educator' from the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche declared that "our schools and professors simply turn aside from any moral instruction or content themselves with formulae… Never were moral teachers more necessary and never were they more unlikely to be found" (1997: 133). Benjamin takes up this problem in his 1913 essay "Moral Education" and, in connection with ideas developed there, in letters to his friend Carla Seligson. This discussion extends (via a reference to Nietzsche) the idea of a "new youthfulness" into the sphere of "what is probably philosophy of history " (1994: 50) . The necessity of a moral education charged with the task of the ethical cultivation of students is everywhere demanded, and yet the belief that the exertion of moral influence is highly personal frequently renders this demand contradictory within formal systems of education. The problem arises because (in Kantian terms), "the aim of moral education [sittlichen Erziehung] is the formation [Bildung] of the moral will" and yet this pure will is no psychological entity and so not subject to empirical influence. This task can therefore "have nothing to do with any type of In the absence of such a critique, the pedagogical groundlessness of moral instruction means that "nothing further remains than for it to conduct a peculiar sort of civic -instead of moral -education, in which everything at bottom voluntary becomes necessary" and ultimately justified through appeal to rationalistic or psychological examples intended to influence the student (2011: 110-111). Today, the continuing emphasis on vocationality, credentialism and narrow specialization in the instruction pertaining to systems of mass education has led to a similar concern with the reintroduction of moral or civic education for the development of good character, citizenship or resilience. 5 As Benjamin points out, the lack of any theoretical consideration of how such comportment could be learned within the framework of mass systems ensures its amounting to little more than political posturing, however time-consuming and wasteful of resources.
His own problematic solution is to appeal to the "principle of the Free School Community, the principle of ethical community," which is founded on a philosophical idea of religiosity (2011: 109). The religious dimension of this community is grounded in the sense that "all morality and religiosity originates in solitude with God" (2011: 110) . In a letter of 1913, Benjamin writes similarly that "we need only to live in rational solitude, somewhat less concerned about this difficult present and about ourselves. We will steadfastly rely on young people who will find or create the forms for the time between childhood and adulthood" (1994: 40) . Claiming that "the ideal person in relationship to the idea" constitutes a profound form of loneliness that is possible only within a perfect community, Benjamin adds that such loneliness 11 "destroys what is human about him" (1994: 50). Another letter asserts that, "in every individual who is born, no matter where, and turns out to be young, there is, not 'improvement,' but perfection from the very start. This is the goal that [Viktor] Hueber so messianically feels is near.
Today I felt the awesome truth of Christ's words: Behold, the kingdom of God is not of this world, but within us" (1994: 54). In "The Religious Position of the New Youth" (1914), Benjamin compares this religiosity to that of the "first Christians, to whom the world likewise appeared to be so utterly overflowing with the sacred -which could arise in each and all -that it deprived them of the power to speak and act." And yet youth is compelled to struggle "as long as the religious community does not yet exist": in such struggle the "figure of the sacred reveals itself" (2011: 170) . This latter process constitutes a further source for Benjamin's messianism of youth: "It may dismiss no object, no person, for in each (in the advertising kiosk and in the criminal) the symbol or the sacred can arise" (2011: 169).
Yet the conditions for such a community are absent, Benjamin admits in writing to Seligson, and the "greatest obstacle the youth of today must overcome" is the assessment of them as possessing a naïve and sentimentalized innocence that needs to be protected (1994: 51). He names the self-awareness of a calling -the older, religious idea of a vocation -knowledge and identifies this with guilt. Consequently, "youth must lose its innocence (animal-like innocence) in order to become guilty," but guilt may be expiated only through action, which is always innocent: "through the most active, most fervent, and blind fulfilment of duty." In this way, a different kind of innocence -one beyond good and evil -comes about through action, an innocence of the sort that Benjamin, like Nietzsche, associated with Goethe (1994: 51). 12 In the absence of a broader community, this blind fulfilment of duty was to resolve itself in the most tragic ways. The Youth movement grew significant enough that Wyneken was eventually denounced in Bavaria by the Minister for Culture, their journal Anfang banned, and the "talking-rooms" in which the students conducted their debates, forced to close. Similar accusations were made in the Prussian and Baden parliaments, leading to Wyneken's expulsion from the coalition of Free German Youth and the splitting into factions of the movement's leadership. The outbreak of war in 1914 and Wyneken's perhaps expedient public support of the German war effort sealed these divisions (see Utley 1979 and Utley 1999) . As a generation of young men were sent to be slaughtered at the front, several members of Benjamin's student circle committed suicide, either in nihilistic despair or political defiance. In particular, the double suicide of his closest friend Fritz Heinle in a pact with Rika Seligson (Carla's sister) in 1914, which took place in the branch headquarters of the movement, was compounded by Wyneken's subsequent betrayal of Youth.
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of these experiences for Benjamin. In Benjamin's early politics of Youth, suicide -the self-sacrifice of the individual as mute protest against the inadequacy of justice -represents the intoxicating and dangerous limit of an essentially tragic vision. It is precisely this tragic dimension that Benjamin (not to say Nietzsche himself) seeks -and perhaps ultimately fails -to distance himself from in his philosophy.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that Benjamin's traumatic break from the Youth Movement does not simultaneously constitute an abandonment of this thought, but contributes to the submerging of his political position into what he himself calls a 'harder, purer, more invisible radicalism.' 6 As such, it constitutes an unforgettable historical layer of the underground or cryptic politics of his later writings.
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II.
The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.
-Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks
Benjamin's next sustained attempt to develop his political thought was to be a large-scale study begun in the early 1920s (Steiner 2001: 44, 66) . As Uwe Steiner notes, while Benjamin's political thought should be placed "in the context of the Nietzsche-reception in the milieu of early Expressionism," his own "definition of politics" as "the satisfaction of unenhanced humanness" is constructed in direct opposition to any Zarathustran politics of the Übermensch, which Benjamin now reads as "the most radical and most magnificent realization of the religious essence of capitalism" (Steiner 2001: 61-2) .
In his essay Fate and Character from 1919, the contours of an alternative exit route from tragic suffering begin to be delineated. Given the melancholic features often associated with the character of Benjamin, it is remarkable that this reference to happiness is rooted in a discussion of comedy. Yet, although ostensibly a discussion of ancient tragedy and modern comedy, at its heart this essay involves a subtle disengagement from Nietzsche. Specifically, Benjamin takes issue with Nietzsche's Heraclitean aphorism in Beyond Good and Evil, that "if a man has character, he has an experience that constantly recurs" (1996: 202). Benjamin takes this as indicative of a conception of fate that conflates fate (the constantly recurring experience) with character, understood in a vague sense as the cause of this fate. This understanding of fate and character regards the latter as a network of threads, composed of broad character traits that are 14 connected by finer strands to external events of fate, a network that knowledge tightens -like the net of fate -into a dense fabric, from which the cloth of character is cut (1996: 203-204) .
Consequently, these threads of character are judged in quasi-ethical terms.
Benjamin refuses such a conflation on the grounds that, if it is problematic to assert that a person's future can be read from distant external features (the stars, for example), it is no less problematic to suppose that inner character can be read from proximate external ones (physiognomy or gestures, for example). But if character can be read from such external signs, then a pragmatic conception of the person as active or practical, and thus capable of changing bodily features or physical surroundings, implies that the production of signs cannot be limited to immediate causal connections but extends to the whole realm of wider experience, such as changes to the natural environment (1996: 201-2). Since this "active" or "pragmatic" conception of the person intervenes in that sphere previously associated with the fate that passively befalls a person, what Benjamin calls "character" cannot be delimited to the immediate context of the "inner" or "private" realm, and it thus threatens to contravene the very concept of character.
Benjamin proposes that an adequate conception of character therefore needs to be delimited more clearly from the concept of fate. To do so, he introduces the distinction between cultic myth and theological justice: fate must be detached from its association with religious punishment, Benjamin insists, since this conception refers to misfortune only as divine In his fragment on capitalism as religion, this understanding of fate pertains to the mythical domain of the absolute cult, whose modern apotheosis is a capitalism which knows only duties and punishment and nothing of redemption and bliss. Benjamin identifies such fate with the law as "a residue of the demonic stage of human existence" (1996: 203), a demonic ambiguity associated in the Critique of Violence with the false equality of abstract rights, which are one manifestation of the violent power exerted in all mythical lawmaking (1996: 249). This demonic ambiguity perhaps finds its modern apotheosis in education, to the extent that the right to education is, in many instances, exceptional in simultaneously being a legally policed compulsion that must be exercised (see Blacker 2013: 196-97 ).
The moral speechlessness and self-sacrifice of the tragic hero invokes the idea of justice against this cultic or demonic domain not by demanding compensation but by a protest that calls 
III.
If they are fit and well, children are absolute monsters of activity:...tearing up, breaking up, building, they're always at it. (1994: 94) . In this way, the educator's relation to instruction resembles that of the older storyteller, in the sense that he or she 21 "takes what he tells from experience -his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale"; that is, he or she transmits it (2002: 146).
While the novel concerns the "solitary individual" and has no place for "instruction"
[Unterweisungen], the storyteller's connection to a "chain of tradition which passes a happening on from generation to generation" brings the storyteller into the ranks of teachers and sages (2002: 154) . In Kafka's writings, which represent the very "sickness of tradition" manifested in the epoch of the novel, one can see how it is possible to cling to the form of "transmissibility," even if this must be at the expense of the content of truth. 9 This is, Benjamin reminds us, the radiant serenity of Kafka's messianic hope: "only a fool's help is real help" and folly belongs to the creatures and (teaching) assistants (2002: 318-320) .
In this sense, the instructor -who in playing a mediating role interrupts the solitude of the individual learner and intrudes upon the silence of the older generation of the school towards Youth -is not the block to education but rather its precondition: the one who mediates the relationship between generations. For the educator, like the breaking wave in the surging sea of teachings, "the only things that matters ...is to surrender itself to a motion in such a way that it crests and breaks" (1994: 94). Here, we are introduced to something akin to an alternative and law-destroying violence that The Critique of Violence identifies with justice (1996: 249). This is manifested not only by religious tradition, he claims, but also in "educative power, which in its perfected form stands outside the law" and serves as an "expiating moment" that may annihilate "goods, right, life, and suchlike" but never, we might say, the innocence of character (1994: 94) .
This breaking "is education in its actual sense" and instruction is the moment in which tradition emerges, becomes visible and free: "the only nexus of the free union of the old with the new speaks of a form of nonviolent control which "has more influence on the child in essential matters than anything else (more than corporeal punishment and, above all, more than the much vaunted power of example)," associating this with the Late Romantic theory of observation (1996: 286). Unlike early German Romanticism, the latter is centered not on reflection but on love, specifically on a form of pedagogic observation: "For the late Romantics, observation was a sun beneath whose rays the object of love opens up to further growth. But if its rays were withheld, the object of love remained in the dark and wilted" (1996: 285).
The reference to late Romanticism here seems most directly to invoke Friedrich Schlegel's pessimistic recasting of his earlier theory of irony (understood, as Benjamin explains in The Concept of Criticism, as "poetic reflection" which can progressively "raise this reflection to higher and higher powers" and so rise infinitely above all finiteness) into something more sceptical and tragic, as evinced in his last lectures: "Genuine irony is the irony of love. It arises from the feeling of finiteness and of one's own limitations and the apparent contradiction of these feelings with the concept of the infinite inherent in all genuine love" (Behler 1998: 45-46) . 23 However, a less direct but more apposite comparison -and one more in line with the comedic strand being emphasised in this approach -might be made to Jean Paul's doctrine on education Levana. This also deploys the romantic trope of the learner blooming in the warmth and light of the educator's consciousness: "whenever a sunbeam strikes [the child's consciousness] …(for all teaching is warming into life rather than sowing) there the green leaves burst forth," and the "fruit" of self-consciousness "bursts through the clouds like a sun, and wonderfully reveals a beaming universe" (1891: and the finite contrast of comedy by contrasting both perspectives against each other, resulting in a negative infinity that "annihilates both great and small, because before the infinite, everything is equal and nothing" (1973: 88-89) . This idea of humor "as the inverted sublime annihilates not the individual," however, "but the finite through its contrast with the idea. It recognizes no individual foolishness, no fools, but only folly and a mad world " (1973: 88) . 10 To return to Benjamin's discussion of education: what is key is that this model of observation (which "is much more important …than reflection" and "exemplary" in the sphere of pedagogy) is a medium in which both the growing child, who is educated by the regulating 24 observation of the adult, and the observing adult, whose eye is regulated and "learns to see what is appropriate to the child," are mutually interactive (1996: 285) . This posits education as a medium of intergenerational and pragmatic transmission, at once theoretical and practical, in which both educator and educated are simultaneously educated. The problem that occurs when this model is transposed to the sphere of historical growth within human society, as happens with the later Romanticism of Schlegel and Carl von Savigny, is that historical development concerns not solely peaceful growth but also bloody conflict, and therefore requires the introduction of theological concepts of justice as well (Benjamin 1996: 285) .
Benjamin himself takes up this pedagogical model on a grand, historical scale in OneWay Street and in the earlier version of the Work of Art essay, where he claims that the purpose of technology is misconceived as the imperialist mastery of nature in the same way that the canewielder teaches the purpose of education to be the mastery of children (1996: 487) . Correcting this misconception, he counters: "Is not education, above all, the indispensable ordering of the relationship between generations and therefore mastery (if we are to use this term) of that relationship and not children? And likewise technology is the mastery not of nature but the relationship between nature and humanity" (487). In the Work of Art essay, this romantic model of pedagogy therefore provides Benjamin with his messianic distinction between "first" and "second" technology. The former aims at a mastery over nature through the maximal possible utilization of human beings, whose consequences are valid for all time (a vision culminating in mythical guilt and sacrifice). The latter is distinguished from the first in seeking the minimal possible use of human beings through provisional and improvised experimentation and testing, whose goal is not mastery over nature but an interplay between nature and humanity that is liberating for both. 
The Inhumanities
If revolutionary politics assumes a pedagogical dimension in the anthropological materialism of Benjamin's mature writings, the more specific question of the end of formal education with which this discussion started might now be considered from the perspective of an anthropological materialist understanding of pedagogy. What lessons might Benjamin's mature anti-Nietzscheanism hold for the contemporary crisis of educational systems, as they undergo the transforming pressures of a short-term "politicization" (often led by the State or by corporations acting in the interests of the State) and encounter the expectations of social justice connected to expansion and "massification"? Here, I want to draw together the strands of Benjamin's antiNietzscheanism delineated in the foregoing discussion: first, the way in which the centrality of instruction in the process of transmission involves not the silencing of one generation before another but the concentrated historical transmissibility or dialogic interplay between generations; second, the way in which the simplicity, generality and innocence of student character might be foregrounded not as a social problem for education to resolve (in the formation or cultivation of "character" through moral or civic education) but as possessing a positively monstrous and destructive agency in relation to this educational process.
Kraus's highest achievement, for Benjamin, is that he makes even the newspaper quotable, wrenching it destructively from its context but thereby transporting the empty phrase into his own sphere, simultaneously punishing and saving it. In connection with this, Benjamin invokes the figure of the child, as the teacher of humanity: Kraus "never envisaged the child as the object of education; rather, in an image from his own youth, he saw the child as the antagonist of education who is educated by this antagonism, not by the educator" (1999b: 452).
Here, the role of student as antagonistic agent in relation to the teacher as transmitter of learnings 27 is clarified: the teacher must transform what he or she has learned in order to make it transmissible or quotable for the learner who provokes such transformation; education is the antagonistic medium of such transmissibility. In a comedic blow to the vanity of academics, it assigns the educative force that Benjamin discerned as a manifestation of divine violence to the learner rather than the educator, who is nonetheless required as the intermediary object of this force.
Speaking of the literary impoverishment of the genius into journalism in "The Author as
Producer," as in the Work of Art essay, Benjamin writes: "The scene of this literary confusion is the newspaper, its content, 'subject matter' that denies itself any other form of organization than that imposed on it by readers' impatience. And this impatience is not just that of the politician expecting information, or of the speculator looking for a stock tip; behind its smoulders the impatience of people who are excluded and think they have the right to see their own interests expressed" (1999b: 771). Journalism therefore conceals a dialectical moment: the dissolution of the conventional distinction between the author and public. Benjamin thus asserts the pedagogical usefulness of this impoverishment of culture into journalism, against Nietzsche's untimely meditations on the eternal value of culture: "It is, in a word, the literarization of the conditions of living that masters the otherwise insoluble antinomies [of the literary apparatus].
And it is at the scene of the limitless debasement of the word -the newspaper, in short -that salvation is being prepared" (1999b: 772).
It is only more recently that social and technological innovations in education have brought the same tensions that previously manifested themselves in the sphere of literature and culture to a comparable critical moment. How might we therefore begin to think our contemporary pedagogization 12 of living conditions -the conflation of the time and space of 28 education with that of political society -as containing a dialectical kernel, and what are the implications for instruction in the new spaces of massified and increasingly privatized education?
Here, we might begin to think about not merely the impatience of students but also the affective dimensions of their distraction, boredom, frustration and desire to be entertained, much of which is technologically shaped in relation to new forms of (anti-)social media, as instances of pedagogical agency themselves. This is intended to serve as a polemical rebuke to any overly-simplistic rhetorical construction of students as consumers, which tends to narrow the criteria of student agency to legitimated models of creative, social behavior (modelled on that practiced by the educators) and therefore to cast the student as predominantly passive or apathetic. Too often, this fails to distinguish effects of the commodification, marketization and privatization of educational institutions from the longer ongoing process of massification in both a social and historical sense. A key historical locus of antagonism within current intergenerational transmission, for example, is that between the experiences of so-called "digital natives" being taught and the "digital immigrants" teaching them (Prensky 2001 ). Equally, the creative self-formation of individual students so prized by the liberal arts and humanities often fails to register the extent to which these soft skills of character, resilience, empathy, spontaneity, critical thinking and so on are increasingly valued as "human capital" not merely in the creative and service industries but by businesses in general (Martin 2008) . This is therefore also a call to remain committed to the antagonistic spaces of mass education as sites of continuing struggle and transformation, and not to voluntarily abandon them at the historical moment they have become, relatively speaking, ever more diverse in terms of the class, gender and ethnicity of the student body. [Gebildeten] is to be rejected" (Hutter 2006: 34) . In contrast, the process of pedagogization, anticipated in negative terms as the ongoing merging of the "educated" and the masses through education in Nietzsche's early writings, holds open the possibility for a Benjaminian analysis of the debasement and salvation of education itself: it is the scene of an interplay between generations in which the antagonistic and destructive demands of the student provoke ever-new transformations and revisions of the educator, the educational institution, and the documents of education, so as to render them transmissible for the coming generation.
It is this revolution that Benjamin anticipates when, in his unpublished note on reexamining the relationship between teaching and research, he imagines an alternative approach to education based on the principle that "teaching is capable of adapting to new strata of students in such a way that a rearrangement of the subject matter would give rise to entirely new forms of knowledge " (1999b: 419-20) . Accordingly, "subjects that have long been investigated and appropriated by scholars need to be emancipated from the forms in which such scholarly acquisition took place, if they are still to have any value and any defined character today;" such emancipation would lead to "a less banal, more considered learning," but also to the overthrow of "the whole pernicious spectrum of critical methods" favored by researchers. "In short,"
Benjamin concludes, "we should not look to research to lead a revival in teaching; instead, it is 30 more important to strive with a certain intransigence for an -albeit very indirect -improvement in research to emerge from the teaching" (1999b: 419).
This kind of teaching-led research is not about improving the quality and learning outcomes of teaching through the research of the educator or empirical research into education;
nor is it about turning the student as consumer into the student as producer or researcher, as is understood within the existing apparatus of scholarly knowledge. Rather, it seeks to reconsider the dialectical value of destruction and de-formation (rather than the uncritical valorization of creation and formation) within the educational process and -in contrast to the usual understanding of this process encroaching on education from without -to ascribe this agency to the learner, whose object is the educational apparatus itself.
